

# AFP® Annual Conference



November 7-10, 2010 | San Antonio

ORIGINAL  
ESSENTIAL  
UNBIASED  
INFORMATION



## Cybercrime May Be Headline News, But Traditional Payments Fraud is Alive and Well

Anita Patterson, CTP  
Director  
Cox Enterprises, Inc.

Jerl Rossi, CTP  
Corporate Director  
Northrop Grumman

Nick Alex, CTP  
Senior Vice President  
SunTrust Bank

# Agenda

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- Introductions and Definitions
- Current Fraud Landscape
- Company Overviews
- Fraud Stories
- Best Practices
- Wrap-up/Questions

# AFP Payments Advisory Group (PAG)

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- **PAG was formed to promote the interests of the treasury profession in the development of payment systems.**
- **Its goals are to: monitor, evaluate and report to AFP members on changes in payment systems and their impact on treasury; promote best practices in payments; and present the treasury perspective to payment systems developers.**
- **The PAG is an AFP volunteer group composed of senior executives from corporate treasury and banking and an attorney-adviser:**

- Sharon Petrey, Coca-Cola (PAG Chairman)

- Jennifer Bezdek, Fluor
- Fred Butterfield, Trust Company of America
- Terry Crawford, AMC Entertainment
- Rue Jenkins, Costco
- Gary Kawka, Cytotec Industries
- Brad Larson, Claire's Stores
- Bill Lundeen, Procter & Gamble

- Anita Stevenson Patterson, Cox Enterprises
- Jerl Rossi, Northrop Grumman
- Gavin Waugh, Wendy's/Arby's
- Karen Nash-Goetz, T. Rowe Price
- Nicholas Alex, SunTrust Bank
- Mary Burchette, U.S. Bank
- Claudia Swendseid, Federal Reserve

# Cybercrime versus Traditional Fraud

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- Cybercrime
  - Criminal activity using computers and the internet to steal identities and/or millions of dollars from online bank accounts; also includes creating and distributing viruses
- Traditional
  - Criminal activity with the intent to deceive and steal through core bank processes, such as Cash, Checks, ACH, Wires and Cards

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# 2009 Fraud Landscape

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- 79% of organizations experienced payment fraud in 2009
- 90% that experienced payments fraud in 2009 were victims of check fraud
- For other payment methods – organizations report increased attempts for:

ACH Credits	7%
ACH Debits	25%
Corporate Commercial Cards	17%
Consumer Credit/Debit Cards	20%
Wire Transfers	3%


**Checks remain the payment method most frequently targeted**

Source: 2010 AFP Payments Fraud and Control Survey

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# Check Fraud – Still Booming

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**\$1.024 Billion**  
Estimated 2008 Losses

Eight in 10 banks reported check fraud losses


Check fraud cases increased 26% between 2006 to 2008

Source: 2009 ABA Deposit Fraud Survey

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# Check Fraud: Identity Theft

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[www.CartoonStock.com](http://www.CartoonStock.com)



search ID: form176

HE'S UPSET BECAUSE THE FRAUDSTERS WHO  
STOLE HIS IDENTITY GAVE IT BACK...



# ACH Fraud

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**11%** of victims  
suffered losses in  
2009

More than half of the banks surveyed  
experienced ACH fraud

Over **50%**  
of companies that  
suffered losses did  
not use fraud control  
services


Most accounts affected by ACH fraud belonged  
to individuals and/or small businesses

Source: 2010 AFP Payments Fraud and Control Survey and  
2009 ABA Deposit Fraud Survey

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
# Debit Card Fraud – Alive and Well

## POS Signature Debit



**\$788 Million**  
Estimated 2008 Losses


## POS PIN Debit



Source: 2009 ABA Deposit Fraud Survey

# Corporate Commercial Card Fraud

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Source: 2010 AFP Payments Fraud and Control Survey

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# James M. Cox – Our Founder

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Farmer  
School Teacher  
Reporter  
Publisher  
Entrepreneur  
Community Leader  
Politician



*“It was my policy to give all these men a helpful general supervision, but never to fetter their initiative.”*

*Gov. James M. Cox*

# Cox Enterprises Inc. (CEI) Is...



... more than 66,000 employees working for 300 businesses in 6 major operating subsidiaries.



6M residential + commercial customers



Manheim

10M vehicles touched; 5M vehicles sold



17 dailies, 1.4M Sunday circulation; 45M Valpak homes



15 stations reaching 30M viewers




86 stations reaching 240M weekly listeners



16M+ viewers; largest auto marketplace in the world

# CEI Total U.S. Market Reach



Cox media and technology outlets reach 1 in 3 Americans each day.

# CEI - Fraud Experienced

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- Check Fraud
- ACH Fraud
- P-Card fraud
- Cash Fraud
  - Passing counterfeit bills
  - Stealing of cash



# Northrop Grumman - Company Overview

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- **Founded in 1939**
- **Leader in global security**
- **Located in 50 states and 25 countries**
- **120,000 employees**
- **\$34 billion in revenue in 2009**
- **\$69 billion total backlog**



## Northrop Grumman – Company Overview

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- One of the nations largest aerospace and defense contractors
  - Major customer is the U.S. Government and other major A&D companies – Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Raytheon, Boeing
  - Majority of payment receipts are made by ACH
  - Significant initiative to convert supplier payments to ACH
  - High level of electronic payroll by ACH
-

# Northrop Grumman - Fraud Experienced

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- Check Fraud
- Commercial Card Fraud
  - Procurement Card (P-card)
  - Travel and Entertainment (T&E) Card
- No cash transactions

# AGENDA

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- Introductions and Definitions
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# Northrop Grumman - Incidences of Check Fraud

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- Investigations performed by corporate Security
    - Approximately 35 to 40 attempts of check fraud per year
    - Follow up with Fed/State/Local authorities
  - Average check amount
    - \$5,000 to \$10,000 with a range of \$500 to \$80,000
  - Typical scenarios
    - Origination from West Africa
    - Internet-based scams involving Craigslist or EBay
    - Check issued for greater amount; excess to be returned via Western Union
-

# Northrop Grumman - Typical Check Fraud Investigation

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- Notification to Northrop Grumman and handling by Corporate Treasury and Corporate Security
  - Suspicion by payee not expecting NGC check or involving odd email exchange
  - Payee contacts Northrop Grumman entity by phone, email, fax, or web
  - Fraudulent item forwarded to corporate Treasury with subsequent investigation by corporate Security

# Example of Fraudulent Check Discovered Through Positive Pay Service

Payables Web Services

Page 1 of 1

[Print](#)

**Exception Type:** Item Paid, No Issue Data

**Decision:**

**Chk#:** 243662

**Acct#:** [REDACTED]

**\$Amt:** 574.33


\*031000011\*  
12/27/2007  
00000555374830

This is a LEGAL COPY of your check. You can use it the same way you would use the original check.

150346885 000776

Document Seq #  
12280131076284711911  
KNDMFP30  
12/28/07


2002/2/29 E06L0002TE03  
465E24T000000000



⑈ 243662 ⑈

⑈ 0000057433 ⑈

Example of Fraudulent Check:  
"Post No Checks" check block would prevent payment





# Fraud Protection Results

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No Financial Losses To-Date!



## More Check Stories..

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- Employee was to contact vendors who had not cashed checks. Employee was to then void the original check and reissue. He reissued the checks alright – to himself!! He set up fictitious vendors or in some cases just changed vendor name to himself.
- Employee in Accounting had checks cut to himself complete with fictitious back-up. All money recovered.

# ACH Fraud??

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- National theater chain is required to send checks for refunds for gift cards
- Started seeing ACH credits come through
  - Small amounts 41¢; 35¢
  - No debits yet!
  - Accounts closed to debits, opened to credits

# ACH Fraud??

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- Auction location received ACH credits to AP account sent via PayPal
  - Small amounts – 2¢; 20¢
  - Notified bank – bank worked with PayPal & PayPal immediately closed the sender's account

# Debit Card Fraud

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- Counterfeit Card
  - Elderly client reports several PIN transactions
  - Fraud amount About \$1100 with \$300 in fees
  - Mostly gas charges – but she does not drive
- Skimming
  - Skimmer attached to a bank ATM machine
  - 100 clients used ATM and information was captured

## P-Card Fraud

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- Charges for \$1 from convenience store
- Card issuer called to verify
- No harm, no foul – card cancelled and reissued

*Companies seem to catch the external fraud  
it's the fraud by employees that seems to get  
away!*

*– at least for a while*

# P-Card Fraud

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## *AND SPEAKING OF INTERNAL...*

- IT Manager used P-card to buy personal “stuff”.
    - Created fictitious receipts
    - Caught because of evasive answers
  - Former university employee sentenced to 10 years in prison!!
  - 3 employees from a Washington state company indicted – trial was set for June 6, 2010 but more charges filed
-

## More P-Card stories

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- Internal company manager defrauds company using the company's P-card
  - Set up shell company to funnel funds
  - Created invoices and falsified data
    - Officially “received items” at shipping dock
    - Enlisted services of a legitimate company who took funds and then forwarded to employee (took a 10% cut)
  - Improprieties discovered through internal audit
  - Employee and others involved serving 5 year jail sentence in Los Angeles



# Cash – Still out there!

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- Cash “fraud” -
  - Paying with counterfeit 20’s, 50’s and 100’s



# Cash – Still out there!

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*And then there is outright thievery –*

- Snatch and grabs of safes!
- Employee placed petty cash order; delivered to the company location; pocketed cash and did journal entry to balance.
- Accounting supervisor took cash deposits and substituted “check only” deposit slip - \$115,000 worth!
- 3<sup>rd</sup> party payment vendor would take cash payments and never submit the funds to company

## Few Losses

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- Corporations experience few losses IF they:
  - Reconcile accounts timely
  - Have controls in place
  - Use fraud prevention services (payee match positive pay, debit blocks/filters)
  - Notify providers as soon as fraud is suspected

# Agenda

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
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## Best Practices – Checks

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- Use Payee Positive Pay or Reverse Positive Pay
  - Implement ACH debit blocks to prevent electronic fraud
  - Reconcile your accounts timely – daily if possible
  - Add Check block (“Post No Checks”) on demand deposit (depository) accounts –
  - Convert checks to ACH
  - Use Universal Payment Identification Code (UPIC)
-

# Check Security Features - Survivable



Standard Showing Location of Image-Survivable Check Security Features

Source: 2010 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

# Best Practices – ACH

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- Protect your accounts with debit filters/blocks
- Reconcile your accounts timely
- Use ACH positive pay
- Use ACH Daily Transaction Reviews
- Use “Post no Checks” restriction on depository accounts

# Best Practices – Debit Cards

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- Transaction level monitoring
  - Review transaction history
- Real-time authorization declines
- ATM devices checked for strange devices
- Pay close attention to capture devices
- Make sure you are aware of surroundings



## Best Practices – P-Card

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- Implement detailed policies & procedures
- Appoint permanent administrator
- Implement a detailed cardholder agreement
- Design a card that minimizes accidental use
- Establish reasonable limits
- Require original receipts
- Institute a recurring audit process

# Best Practices – Cash

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- External –
    - Use counterfeit bill detection devices
      - Pens, machines
    - Secure safes
  - Internal
    - Segregation of duties is imperative
      - Separate cash taking & ordering from reconciliation
    - Run a “cleared check” report to see if there are “suspicious” vendors
    - Institute a recurring audit process
-

# Counterfeit Money

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
## What to do if you suspect a counterfeit bill?

### *At one company they tell their employees:*

- DO NOT PUT YOURSELF IN DANGER
- Do not return the bill to the payer
- Delay the payer by some excuse, if possible, without risking harm
- Observe and record the payer's appearance and that of any companion
- Note the license plate number and make of the payer's car
- Telephone the police or the U.S. Secret Service
- Write your initials and date on an unprinted portion of the suspect bill
- Do not handle the bill more than necessary
- Place the bill in a protective envelope
- Surrender the bill only to a properly identified police officer or a representative of the U.S. Secret Service

# Questions

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# The Message is Clear...

© Cartoonbank.com



*"You know, you can do this just as easily online."*

# Resources

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- Best Practices: [www.afponline.org](http://www.afponline.org)
- Fraud Survey & Statistics: *2010 AFP Payments Fraud & Control Survey* and *2009 ABA Deposit Fraud Survey*
- Know Your Money: [www.secretservice.gov](http://www.secretservice.gov) and [www.moneyfactory.gov](http://www.moneyfactory.gov)
- Image Survivable Check Security Features: *Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis*

# Contact Information

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Nick Alex, CTP

404.813.8142

[nick.alex@suntrust.com](mailto:nick.alex@suntrust.com)

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# Image Survivable Check Security Features



What are Check Security Features



Image-Survivable Check Security Features



Industry Efforts to Address ICSF



DSTU X9.100-172



New Work Item






# Check Security Features

- Check Security features help to reduce check fraud associated with paper check processing
- Check imaging has made many traditional check security features useless, because they do not survive the imaging process. For example:
  - Chemical & thermal sensitive paper
  - Paper incorporating security threads, micro-printed lines, prismatic images, or fluorescent fibers
  - Paper printed with watermarks, embossing, or foils
  - Holograms
  - Anti-splice borders
  - Paper with "original document" or other screens on the back of check
  - "VOID" or other pantographs designed to appear on a photocopy
- Other check security features & processes continue to be effective
  - Modulus check serial numbers/reference numbers
  - Signature verification
  - Positive pay, payee positive pay, etc.

# Traditional Check Security Features






# Image-Survivable Check Security Features

- New image-survivable check security features (ICSFs) have been developed to address issues caused by check imaging
  - Encode check payment data (e.g., payee, check number, account number, amount) into a security mark that is printed on the check
    - Encoding is accomplished via a cryptographic algorithm
    - Party decoding the security mark must use software that encoded the ICSF in order to verify check image
    - Use typically limited to corporate checks where payment data is known at time that check and ICSF is printed
  - Three types of ICSFs: bar-coding, seal-encoding, & digital watermarks
  - A number of software vendors offer image-survivable check security features in their payment products\*

Vendor	Product	URL
Security Litho	Image Secure	<a href="http://www.securitylitho.com">www.securitylitho.com</a>
Wausau Financial Systems	Fraud Detection	<a href="http://www.wausaufs.com">www.wausaufs.com</a>
ProdDocument Solutions	ImageSecure	<a href="http://www.prodocumentsolutions.com">www.prodocumentsolutions.com</a>
SafeChecks	Secure Check Writing	<a href="http://www.safechecks.com">www.safechecks.com</a>
Troy Group	Scan Check	<a href="http://www.troygroup.com">www.troygroup.com</a>
International Security Products	Image Secure	<a href="http://www.isp-vft.com">www.isp-vft.com</a>

\* Not an exhaustive list

# Check Security Features – Survivable



Standard Showing Location of Image-Survivable Check Security Features



# Industry Efforts to Address ICSF

- In 2004, Financial Services Technology Committee (FSTC) initiated an industry project to address barriers to ICSF adoption, primarily the need to implement proprietary vendor software to validate each unique ICSF
  - Recommended standard location & size of ICSF on a check & process for registering cryptographic algorithms & methodology for validating ICSFs
- ASC X9 revised standard to define where on check ICSF would be positioned
- Treasury checks printed by Federal Reserve Banks use an ICSF developed by Fiserv
- Litigation initiated related to ICSF copyright infringement has slowed progress with adoption on ICSFs, generally



# DSTU X9.100-172

- ASC X9 adopted DSTU X9.100-172, based on FSTC's work
  - Enables party accepting check & BOFD to validate check upon receipt without need to implement proprietary vendor software
  - Expires August 7, 2010
- The standard:
  - Part 1 Overview and Security Marks
    - Defines logical roles and processes for using and validating ISCFs
  - Part 2 Data Definitions
    - Data elements in the ICSF Registry, account Directory, and RT Feature List
  - Part 3 Message Definitions
    - Defines communication between systems to validate ISCFs
  - Part 4 Application and Registration Policies and Process
    - Define the roles and responsibilities of the applicant, Registration Authority, and Registration Management Group
    - Defines policies for the ICSF Registry and criteria for an ISCF
    - Defines dispute resolution process
- Standard uses XML for interoperable validation



# ICSF Framework

- **Check Acceptor** — the individual or company that accepts checks for payments or deposit, and decides whether or not to initiate a request to validate an ICSF.
- **Validator** — the company that processes ICSF requests for validation and performs the technical and business functions necessary for processing.
- **Verification Authority** — companies or financial institutions that maintain the information needed for the validation of ICSFs.

The ICSF framework also defines the messages exchanged in the process of validating a check protected by a compliant security feature. The two key messages are:

- **Get Mark Information** — used to determine whether or not a Security Mark should be present on a check, and if a check is protected by an ICSF, to obtain the information needed to validate the check.
- **Validate Marks** — used to request the validation of an ICSF.



# Current State of ICSFs

- ViewPointe is the registration authority & six vendors have registered interoperable ICSFs
- The ICSF Registration Management Group is an X9 group and currently chaired by Curt Hunsicker, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Although six vendors have registered products, no actual usage of registered data has occurred
- The registry can be found at
  - <http://icsf.kgconnect.com>

Vendor	Product	URL
Cheque guard	ChequeSeal	<a href="http://www.cheque-guard.com">www.cheque-guard.com</a>
SQN Banking Systems	Sentry	<a href="http://www.sqnbankingsystems.com">www.sqnbankingsystems.com</a>
Orbograph	Orbograph	<a href="http://www.orbograph.com">www.orbograph.com</a>
Advanced Software Design	SAND	<a href="http://www.asdc.com">www.asdc.com</a>
John H. Harland Company	Validify	<a href="http://www.harland.com">www.harland.com</a>
Fiserv Imagesoft	Fraudguard and Secure Seal	<a href="http://www.imagesoft.fiserv.com">www.imagesoft.fiserv.com</a>





# Next Steps

- Let DSTU X9.100-172 Expire
- Begin New Work Item Proposal
  - Co-Chairs: John McCleary, Harland Clarke  
Brian Salway, Symcor
  - Recording Secretary: Deb Hjortland, FRB
  - Participating Category A Members
    - Nancy Grant, NACHA
    - Dan Harman, Fiserv
    - Rick Lugg, RDM
    - Ann Kirkwood, Wells Fargo
    - Mark Kielman, FRB



# Know Your Money

**1996 style** consists of series years 1996, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2003A and 2006.

**2004 style** incorporates background color and consists of series years 2004, 2004A and 2006.

**Paper** Currency paper consists of 25% linen and 75% cotton and contains small randomly dispersed red and blue fibers embedded throughout the paper.

**Portrait** The 1996 style Federal Reserve Notes (FRNs) have an enlarged and off-center portrait enclosed in an oval frame of concentric lines. The 2004 style FRNs have an enlarged and off-center portrait without a frame.

- 1 **Watermark** The 1996 and 2004 style FRNs have a watermark that is visible from either side when held up to a light source.
- 2 **Color-Shifting Ink** The 1996 style FRNs have color-shifting ink in the lower right-hand corner, that shifts from green to black as the note is tilted 45 degrees. The 2004 style \$10, \$20 and \$50 FRNs have color-shifting ink that shifts from copper to green as the note is tilted 45 degrees. The \$5 FRN does not have color-shifting ink.
- 3 **Security Thread** Genuine FRNs have a clear polyester thread embedded vertically in the paper. The thread is inscribed with the denomination of the note, and is visible only when held up to light. Each denomination has a unique thread position and will glow a unique color in ultraviolet (UV) light.
- 4 **Serial Numbers** The first letter of the serial number on FRNs corresponds to the series year.

1996 Style		2004 Style
A=1996	D= 2003	E= 2004
B=1999	F= 2003A	G = 2004A
C=2001	H= 2006	I= 2006

### Bank Indicators

- 5 **Federal Reserve Indicators** The 1996 style and 2004 style FRNs have a letter-number combination, which identifies one of the 12 issuing Federal Reserve Banks. This letter-number combination appears beneath the serial number on the left. The number corresponds to the position of the letter in the alphabet, e.g.: A1, B2, C3, etc. The second letter of the serial number is the same as the letter in the letter-number combination.
- 6 **Check Letter/ Quadrant Number**
- 7 **Face Plate Number**
- 8 **Series Year**
- 9 **Back Plate Number (Not shown)** Found on the reverse right hand side of the note.

**1996 style \$100 note issued March, 1996**

Under a UV light source, the security thread glows light red/pink.

Watermark



Green to black color-shifting ink

**2004 style \$50 note issued October, 2004**

Under a UV light source, the security thread glows yellow.

Watermark



Copper to green color-shifting ink

**2004 style \$20 note issued October, 2003**

Under a UV light source, the security thread glows green.

Watermark



Copper to green color-shifting ink

# Know Your Money

April 2008  
[www.secretservice.gov](http://www.secretservice.gov)  
[www.moneyfactory.gov](http://www.moneyfactory.gov)



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
April 2008

### 2004 style \$10 note issued March, 2006




Under a UV light source, the security thread glows orange.

Watermark



Copper to green color-shifting ink

### 2004 style \$5 note issued March, 2008



Under a UV light source, the security thread glows blue.

Watermarks



The \$5 FRN does not have color-shifting ink.



U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
**United States Secret Service**

# Know Your Money



**Color-Shifting Ink**  
**Front Lower Right**  
**Numeral**

	Portrait	Watermark	Security Thread	Portrait Microprinting	Other Microprinting	
<b>2004 Style</b>						
50	Grant	Grant	Right of portrait	"THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" along Grant's collar	"50", "USA" and "FIFTY" in two blue stars to the left of the portrait; "FIFTY" along side borders	Copper to Green
20	Jackson	Jackson	Left of portrait	"THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 20 USA" in the border below Treasurer's signature	"USA20" borders beginning part of text ribbon "USA TWENTY", right of portrait	Copper to Green
10	Hamilton	Hamilton	Right of portrait	"THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" below portrait	"USA10" beneath torch to the left of the portrait; "TEN DOLLARS" along side borders	Copper to Green
5	Lincoln	Left: vertical "5 5 5"; Right: large "5"	Right of portrait	"E Pluribus Unum" at top of shield to the right of the portrait; "USA" between columns of eagle's shield; "FIVE DOLLARS" along side borders.	On back, "USA FIVE" on edge of purple 5.	None
<b>1996 Style</b>						
100	Franklin	Franklin	Left of portrait	"THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" along Franklin's collar	"USA100" in lower left numeral	Green to Black
50	Grant	Grant	Right of portrait	"THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" along Grant's collar	"FIFTY" along side borders	Green to Black
20	Jackson	Jackson	Left of portrait	"THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" in the lower oval framing of portrait	"USA20" in lower left numeral	Green to Black
10	Hamilton	Hamilton	Right of portrait	"THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" below portrait above Hamilton's name	"TEN" in lower left numeral	Green to Black
5	Lincoln	Lincoln	Left of portrait	"THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" in the lower oval framing of portrait	"FIVE DOLLARS" along side borders	None
<b>1990 Style</b>						
100	Franklin		Left of portrait	Around portrait "THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"	For further information, contact your local U.S. Secret Service Field Office. The phone number may be found under the Government section of your local telephone directory. April 2008	
50	Grant		Left of portrait	Around portrait "THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"		
20	Jackson		Left of portrait	Around portrait "THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"		
10	Hamilton		Left of portrait	Around portrait "THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"		
5	Lincoln		Left of portrait	Around portrait "THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"		

All Federal Reserve Notes are printed on paper featuring red and blue embedded fibers.

Federal Reserve Notes designed before 1990 do not contain security threads or microprinting.

[www.secretservice.gov](http://www.secretservice.gov)  
[www.moneyfactory.gov](http://www.moneyfactory.gov)



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